

Xi Jinping's Dream: How the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Seeks Hegemony in the World

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Literature Review

In recent years, many studies have appeared on Xi Jinping's¹ (习 近 平) policy, known as his dream. The policy has been called the "Chinese Dream." There are four (4) distinct versions of the Chinese dream theory held by the following groups: (1) Pax Sinica, (2) Chinese "Capitalist" Party, (3) third revolution, and (4) Neo-Totalitarian.² Scholars created the *Pax Sinica* theory which believes that the decline of the United States since the 2008 financial crisis would lead China to control the world. The hyperbolic claims of *Pax Sinica* have often been defined as "Easternization" or "When China rules the World" by Graham Allison,³ Anke Berndzen,⁴ Martin Jacques,⁵ and Gideon Rachman.⁶ Scholars in the Chinese "Capitalist" Party attempt to claim China's strengths by focusing on economic development from the top. Since the CCP is opening reform of the economy, the CCP has been referred to as the Chinese "Capitalist" Party. Lance Gore,⁷ Andreas Møller Mulvad,⁸ Minxin Pei,⁹ David Shambaugh,¹⁰ and Yabuki Susumu¹¹ might belong to this category. Elizabeth Economy's *The Third Revolution: Xi Jinping and the New Chinese States* is often called the "third revolution."¹² Since 1949, the People's Republic of China (PRC) considered Mao Zedong the leader of the first revolution by founding a new nation. Mao's utopian-egalitarian universalism caused the Chinese people to suffer for decades. The second revolution by Deng Xiaoping opened the economy to the world. By emphasizing common prosperity, Deng's pro-market economy approach provided a little hope for the Chinese people. Today, Xi Jinping has launched his Chinese

dream to rejuvenate the Chinese nation. Masafumi Iida,¹³ Josef Gregory Mahoney,¹⁴ Zheng Wang,¹⁵ and Feng Zhang¹⁶ can be categorized in the third revolution theory group. In the final theory of Xi's dream, Jean-Philippe Béja called Xi's regime neo-totalitarian by claiming the "Making China Great Again"¹⁷ theory. The populist candidate appealed to the people. But, Xi Jinping does not have to appeal to his people because he is a dictator in China. Yabuki Susumu¹⁸ and Suizheng Zhao¹⁹ might belong to this neo-totalitarian theory. Interestingly, some scholars outside of social sciences have also studied Xi's dream. For instance, by utilizing psycho-historical analysis, Jill Hurley focused on the "humiliation" card to define the "red dream."²⁰

On May 9, 2021, the CCP launched the Long March 5B rocket carrying 22-tons into space. Billions of people watched live on the internet, tracking the out-of-control Chinese rocket as it crashed into earth. Upon its demise, the debris from the rocket dropped off around the Indian Ocean. This failure symbolized that another pillar of Xi Jinping's dream was beginning to end. The Beijing regime has repeatedly challenged the world-system by creating many conflicts since Xi took control in China. Other examples of this unsuccessful reign include increasing militarization of uninhabited islets in the South China Sea (SCS), frequently increasing air space security in Taiwan, ending the "one country two systems" in Hong Kong, spreading Covid-19 around the world, mediating the 2020 U.S. presidential election, insisting that the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands²¹ are a core national interest, and finally overtaking the United States as the world hegemony. Due to limited space, this paper is primarily focused on the expansion of the Chinese maritime power and Sino-Japanese territorial dispute of 2013 which applied Xi Jinping's Dream or the Chinese Dream theory.

Xi Jinping's Dream = Chinese Dream

The Chinese Dream is not a new concept and is not the creation of Xi Jinping himself. However, the phrase the Chinese Dream has been promoted by many Chinese political leaders, such as Hu Jintao (胡锦涛), Jiang Zemin (江泽民), Deng Xiaoping (邓小平), and Mao Zedong (毛泽东) in different forms as a part of their political platforms. Xi's dream is like an old wine in a new bottle with the dream's label.²² When Xi Jinping grabbed power in 2012, he already had an idea – the Chinese Dream – to manipulate Chinese policy. Xi Jinping stated:

Everyone has an ideal, ambition and dream. We are now all talking about the Chinese Dream. In my opinion, achieving the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation has been the greatest dream of Chinese people since the advent of modern times. This dream embodies the long-cherished hope of several generations of the Chinese people, gives expression to the overall interests of the Chinese nation and the Chinese people, and represents the shared aspiration of all the sons and daughters of the Chinese nation.²³

To achieve the rejuvenation of China – **to double the 2010 GDP and per capita income of urban**

and rural residents, and to build China into a modern socialist country by 2049 – is Xi’s dream.²⁴ Xi’s great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation means making China a strong country. By emphasizing economic development in China, Xi Jinping is setting the stage to carry out his dream.

On March 17, 2013, at the First Session of the 12th National People’s Congress (NPC), Xi emphasized his idea again: “We must redouble our efforts and forge ahead relentlessly to advance the cause of building Chinese socialism and endeavor to realize the Chinese Dream of the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. … The Chinese Dream is, the final analysis, the dream of the people; so we must rely firmly on them to realize it, and we must steadily deliver benefits to them.”²⁵ His words make it sound like his dream is equal to the dream of the people. While he is using the concept of the American Dream, this Chinese Dream is in no way similar or equal to the American Dream. Xi Jinping has simply imposed his desired onto the Chinese people. When he visited the United States on June 7, 2013, Xi talked to President Obama about the Chinese Dream:

The Chinese Dream is about making our country prosperous and strong, revitalizing the nation and bringing a happy life to its people. It is a dream of peace development, cooperation, and mutual benefit. It has many things in common with all the beautiful dreams, including the American Dream, of people all over the world.²⁶

Xi is totally misinterpreted the basic principle behind the American Dream, which is strengthened by freedom, democracy, and human rights. No single Chinese in mainland China can enjoy any of these fundamental principles. The Chinese people have been enslaved since 1949 by a group of people in the CCP, led by none other than Xi Jinping.

Long time suspicions by Western scholars that the Chinese dream of harboring untoward ambitions is precisely right. By 2018, *Renlei mingyun gongtongti* (人類運命共同体) [Community of Common Destiny for Mankind], another propaganda from Xi Jinping, was officially adopted into the Chinese constitution at the 13th NPC as a constitutional amendment, in Xi’s second term. Some scholars called this a “Xi Jinping doctrine for China’s international relations.”²⁷ This naïve analysis is nothing more than an apology to the CCP. Both internally and externally, Xi wishes to establish a “win-win” formula to encourage world leaders.²⁸ This plan, according to Jin Canrong (金灿荣), advisor for the State Council of the PRC, means that China will win twice,²⁹ deceiving the world’s leaders by hiding Xi’s hegemonic ambition. This “win-win” theory was also criticized by Attorney General William Barr on July 17, 2020.³⁰ It is clear that Xi’s dream is not to make the Chinese people rich, but his ambitions have expanded to the hegemony of the world. As a Chinese scholar Zhao Suizheng warns that Xi’s dream is “a mixture of communism, nationalism, and Leninism that is meant to strengthen and discipline the CCP.”³¹

From Hu Jintao's Idea to Xi Jinping's Dream

A new agenda for the Chinese oceanic strategy was outlined in the opening speech of the 18th CCP Congress in November 2012 when Hu Jintao made his last keynote report to congress as the head of the party. The report contains a total of 12 parts including (but not limited to) economy, science, military, and foreign policy. The report states, "We should enhance our capacity for exploiting marine resources, develop the marine economy, protect the marine ecological environment, resolutely safeguard China's maritime rights and interests, and *build China into a maritime power* (emphasis added)."³² Hu emphasized *haiyang qiangguo* (海洋强国) [maritime power], which has not been in the CCP report since the establishment of the CCP in 1921. China's policy failed to "prohibit entering the sea" after Zheng He's voyages in the Ming dynasty,³³ and needed to improve China as a strong oceanic nation within 10 years.³⁴ The wording of *haiyang qiangguo* was in section VIII of the report to the 18th party congress under the subheading "Making Great Efforts to Promote Ecological Progress," and not in the sections of foreign relations nor military building. If it had been included in the sections of foreign relations or military building, it would have become a Chinese foreign relations tactic or military strategy. If one does not read extremely carefully, one might not find out the meaning of the wording *haiyang qiangguo* in Hu's report at all. *Haiyang qiangguo* was likely deliberately hidden in the environmental section, downplaying it as a significant strategy.

Immediately after Hu spoke at the party congress, the Chinese scholars began to analyze the wording in the report regarding maritime rights. Jin Cairong noticed that China needed to underscore its maritime rights and interests after having reached the current stage of development because Sino-Japanese relations over the Diaoyu Islands had recently escalated. However, Ma Xiaojun (马晓军), a professor at the Institute for International Strategic Studies at the CCP Central Party School, emphasized that the report had taken shape since the 16th and 17th party congress with a strong stress on continuity and no changes due to the Diaoyu Islands dispute in the ECS. Shi Yinhong (时殷弘), a professor at the School of International Studies at the Renmin University, praised Hu's report for being historically significant as it went beyond making a judgment about the situation in the near-term and pointed out the direction of development vis-à-vis the outside world over the next five or even ten years.³⁵ Ma tried to downplay the significant importance of *haiyang qiangguo* due to tension surrounding the Sino-Japanese relations over the Diaoyu Islands; however, Shi openly highlighted the significance for years to come. Clearly, Hu's *haiyang qiangguo* has become the destiny for the *zhongguo meng* [Chinese dream], which Xi emphasized so much right now. Even the Chinese official media tried to downplay the importance of the *haiyang qiangguo* strategy, stating that "maritime power" itself "will not lead to marine hegemony,"³⁶ and the Chinese "decision should not be over-interpreted."³⁷ The Chinese Defense Ministry spokesman, Geng Yansheng (耿雁生), expressed at a regular press conference that "China's stance of safeguarding

the country's legitimate sovereign rights and interests should not be regarded as a hardline approach."³⁸ In fact, as the Hong Kong media stated *The Influence of Sea Power on History, 1660-1783*, by American historian Alfred Thayer Mahan, has shaped the leaders of distant China some 120 years later.³⁹ Since 1998, the Chinese Ministry of National Defense has begun to issuing a white paper on China's armed forces biannually. On April 16, 2013, the ministry issued the Chinese national defense paper, *The Diversified Employment of China's Armed Forces*, for the first time, revealing its secretive People's Liberation Army (PLA) armed forces including the navy and second artillery forces in order to show "transparency" to the world.⁴⁰ The 15,000-word white paper on defense contains five parts with an introduction, conclusion, and four appendixes. In the second part of the "Supporting National Economic and Social Development," the defense paper declares:

China is a major maritime as well as land country. The seas and oceans provide immense space and abundant resources for China's sustainable development, and thus are of vital importance to the people's wellbeing and China's future. It is an essential national development strategy to exploit, utilize and protect the seas and oceans, and build China into a *haiyang qiangguo*. It is an important duty for the PLA to resolutely safeguard China's maritime rights and interests (emphasis added).⁴¹

Thus, the *haiyang qiangguo* strategy has officially been implemented into the Chinese national defense system under Xi Jinping, who proclaimed a Chinese Dream, containing *haiyang qiangguo meng* [dream of the maritime power].⁴²

Old Silk Road, New Belt & Road Initiative (BRI)

As early as 2013, a Western scholar Justyna Szczudlik-Tatar called Xi's foreign policy the "new silk road" diplomacy.⁴³ Since then, the Chinese have officially endorsed the idea of a "Silk Road" diplomacy, which Li Keqiang described in his report in the Chinese NPC on March 5, 2014: "The vision of establishing a Silk Road economic belt and a 21st century maritime Silk Road was put forward. The Chinese-ASEAN Free Trade Zone was upgraded. Free trade agreements were respectively signed with Switzerland and Iceland."⁴⁴ This vision was adopted by the Chinese parliament on March 13, 2014. The Silk Road diplomacy embraced two routes: (1) New Land-based Silk Road,⁴⁵ and (2) New Maritime Silk Road. The United States was specifically left out of the Chinese Silk Road diplomacy for a number of reasons, including China's geographical advantage, economic clout, friendly relationships with central Asian countries, and its ability to move quickly on large projects.⁴⁶ The New Maritime Silk Road will start in Quanzhou in the Fujian province, hitting Guangzhou, Beihai, and Haikou before heading south of Malacca Strait. From Kuala Lumpur, the road will head to Kolkata, India, and cross the rest of the Indian Ocean to Nairobi, Kenya. From Nairobi, the Maritime Silk Road goes north around the Horn of Africa and

moves through the Red Sea into the Mediterranean, with a stop in Athens before meeting the land-based Silk Road in Venice.⁴⁷

China has also been challenged to balance between a peaceful rising and safeguarding national territories. On June 27, 2014, Xi Jinping stressed the history of the Chinese “humiliation” era, “One cannot help thinking of China’s modern history when the country was so weak and destitute that it was for everyone to bully…Foreign aggressors broke China’s land and sea defenses hundreds of times, plunging the Chinese nation into the abyss of calamity…”⁴⁸ It is true that during the last 150-years of the “humiliation” era, foreign powers successfully invaded China from the seas, and later from land. Xi urged China’s border troops to build up a strong frontier that is as impenetrable as steel walls. Yet, the following day, at the 60th anniversary of the FPPC (Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence)⁴⁹ meeting, the Chinese President said, “China does not accept the logic that a strong country is bound to become hegemonic, and neither hegemony nor militarism is in the Chinese DNA.”⁵⁰ As Ambassador Joseph Cella pointed out in the Hudson Institute lecture with Miles Yu on June 1, 2021, Xi’s BRI is equivalent to the Japanese “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperty Sphere (大東亜共栄圏),” which was carried out in WWII.⁵¹

The Diaoyu Islands: A “Core National Interest” in 2013

Since Japan purchased the Diaoyu Islands in September 2012, China has responded decisively with what state media called “combination punches.” These measures arose from a statement made by Xi Jinping labeling Japan’s purchase of these islands a “farce.” In fact, the real game-changer during the stand-off between Japan and China came when Beijing officially declared its territorial baselines around the Diaoyu Islands; a move that legally places them under Chinese administration.⁵² Since then, China regularly dispatches law enforcement vessels, planes, and sometimes even jet fighters to patrol waters off the Diaoyu Islands, directly terminating Japan’s *de facto* control of the area for the past 40 years. This has forced Japan to seek help from the United States to support their defense of the surrounding water area, or co-administrative control of the Diaoyu Islands by both Japan and China, a plan that is disapproved by both the United States and Japan.

For a country with 18,999 kilometers of coastline, facing the challenges of safeguarding marine interests at sea, building up comprehensive maritime strength is both practical and necessary for Beijing. “Five Dragons,” excluding the Chinese Navy: (1) China Coast Guard under the Border Control Department of the Ministry of Public Safety, (2) Maritime Surveillance of the State Oceanic Administration under the Ministry of Land and Resources, (3) China Fisheries Law Enforcement Command under the Ministry of Agriculture, (4) Maritime Safety Administration under the Ministry of Transport, and (5) General Administration of Customs, are responsible for maritime law enforcement activities in China.⁵³ The “Five Dragons” have operated patrol ships around the Diaoyu

Islands since 2010. After the NPC meeting in 2013, Beijing reorganized the “Five Dragons” into *Zhongguo haijinju* (中国海警局), the Chinese Coastal Guard (CCG), which became officially operational on July 22, 2013. Under the supervision of the Ministry of Public Security, the CCG has three branches: Beihai, Donghai, and Nanhai with 11 divisions, comprising of 16,296 personnel with weapons.⁵⁴ On December 30, 2014, China’s State Oceanic Administration officially launched a website (www.diaoyudao.org.cn) focusing solely on the Diaoyu Islands, featuring a collection of resources backing Beijing’s sovereignty claim over them. The website will soon be available in at least seven other languages, including Japanese.⁵⁵

In order to safeguard China’s national interests, as the Hong Kong media revealed in 2013, the Chinese foreign policy under Xi Jinping has included the following:

Daguo shi guanjian (大国是关键) [The large nations are crucial],

Zhoubian shi shouyao (周边是首要) The periphery nations are priority],

Fazhanzhong guojia shi jichu (发展中国家是基础) [The developing nations are bases],

Duobian shi zhongyao wutai (多边是重要舞台) [The multiples are important arenas].⁵⁶

Regarding the Diaoyu Islands, “the situation has started to be like playing chicken races; the Chinese are waiting for the Japanese side to give up.”⁵⁷ According to a Chinese white paper, *China’s Peaceful Development* issued in September 2011,

China is firm in upholding its *core interests* which include the following: state sovereignty, national security, territorial integrity and national reunification, China’s political system established by the Constitution and overall social stability, and the basic safeguards for ensuring sustainable economic and social development (emphasis added).⁵⁸

Usually, China uses the term “core interest” when addressing such hot issues as Taiwan, Tibet, and the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. By now, Beijing has clarified publicly that the appellation also pertains to the Diaoyu Islands. As Xi stated, “While pursuing peaceful development, we will never sacrifice our legitimate rights and interests or **China’s core interests. No foreign country should expect China to trade off its core interests or swallow bitter fruit that undermines China’s sovereignty, security or development interests** (emphasis added).”⁵⁹

For the first time, the Chinese regime officially announced that China regarded the Diaoyu Islands as a “core interest.” At a news conference on April 26, 2013, Hua Chunying (华春莹), a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson, stated:

“China’s Peaceful Development,” the white paper released by China’s State Council Information Office in September 2011, made it clear that China will firmly safeguard its core national interests, including national sovereignty, national security and territorial integrity. The Diaoyu Islands issue concerns China’s territorial sovereignty.⁶⁰

This “core interest” statement suggests that Beijing does not intend to make any concessions on the

Diaoyu Islands whatsoever. This statement was made by China's foreign ministry after Gen. Martin Dempsey, the chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, finished visiting China and during his visit to Japan. Dempsey revealed by the NHK Television in Tokyo that the Chinese leaders stressed to him during his visit to Beijing that the Diaoyu Islands are "one of China's core interests."⁶¹ As announced in the Chinese national defense paper, *The Diversified Employment of China's Armed Forces*, on April 16, 2013, China's Ministry of Defense spokesman, Colonel Yang Yujun, unambiguously stated the following at a press conference:

China has an arduous task to safeguard its national unification, territorial integrity and development interests. The country has strengthened its Asia-Pacific military alliances, expanded its military presence in the region, and frequently makes the situation there tenser. On the issues concerning China's territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, some neighboring countries are taking actions that complicate or exacerbate the situation, and ***Japan is making trouble over the issue of the Diaoyu Islands...***

Facing a complex and volatile security situation, the PLA resolutely carries out its historical missions for the new stage in the new century. China's armed forces broaden their visions of their national security strategy and military strategy, and aim at winning local wars under the conditions of informationization, make active planning for the use of armed forces in peacetime, deal effectively with various security threats and accomplish diversified military tasks (emphasis added)...

⁶²

After setting the Air Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea on November 23, 2013, the CCP regime clearly expanded its power. It was for the first time in history in the case of the PRC's national defense white paper that Beijing named Japan as a "trouble maker," and the PLA would take on the task of protecting the sovereignty of the Diaoyu Islands for the sake of China's maritime rights and interests. In other words, the Diaoyu Islands are considered a "core national interest," which need to be safeguarded. In fact, on April 23, 2013, the Japanese right-wings, the *Ganbare Nippon* group, organized a 10-ships flotilla, sailing toward the Diaoyu Islands. Meanwhile, eight Chinese maritime surveillance vessels (the Chinese patrol vessel by Haijian 51, 23, and 46 and Haijing 50, 15, 49, 66, and 137 on patrol the Diaoyu Islands) organized in four formations monitoring the Japanese boats from different angles prevented the Japanese right-wings from landing on the Diaoyu Islands.⁶³ The Haijian 50 came within a kilometer of the major islet of the Diaoyu Islands around 11:00 am.⁶⁴ Over 40 Chinese jet fighters, including the fourth-generation Su-27 and Su-30, were sent to the Diaoyu Islands for the first time. Until this point, China had only deployed J-10 jet fighters to the Diaoyu area.⁶⁵ All this happened while nearly 170 Japanese lawmakers were visiting the Yasukuni Shrine.

Conclusion

In 1963, Anthony Kubek published a bestseller academic books, *How the Far East Was Lost: American Policy and the Creation of Communist China, 1941-1949* from Henry Regnery publisher in Chicago (later reprinting China Academy Hwa Kang, Yang Ming Shan of Taiwan in 1979). Based on massive historical archives, Kubek concluded that the mistakes of 1930s American foreign policy in China created the CCP in the mainland.⁶⁶ The results of his research were forcefully attacked by John King Fairbank from Harvard University, among other scholars.⁶⁷ Ultimately, Kubeku's ideas have been marginalized in American foreign diplomatic and academic fields for decades. About 70 years after Kubeku's warning, National Security Advisor, Robert C. O'Brien, of the Trump Administration, finally admitted that the United States made foreign policy mistakes in 1930s, creating the CCP monster in mainland China. "We could not have been more wrong — and this miscalculation is the greatest failure of American foreign policy since the 1930s."⁶⁸ Kubek was right in 1963, but his ideas had been ignored by the White House. Instead, Henry Kissinger's "foolish" Chinese policy has led the CCP to get rich and created its ambitious hegemony to grasp power over all the earth; the Communist regime spread the COVID-19 virus to kill over 4 million innocent people, probably more in the future.⁶⁹

By 2018, CCG, which had previously been under the command of the State Council, was transferred to the People's Armed Police Force under the command of the Chinese Military Commission. In January 2021, the Chinese "rubber-stamp" parliament passed the Chinese Coast Guard Law and the bill was put into force on February 1, 2021. Under this law, CCG has rights to take "all necessary measures, including the use of weapons" if the CCG is confronted with Japanese coast guards in the sea.⁷⁰ Thus, this law will be applied Sino-Japanese territorial disputes in ECS, Diaoyu Islands. The military conflict between Japan and China seems unavoidable.

On the other hand, Xi gave his keynote speech at the Boao forum on April 20, 2021, and at the end of his speech, he stressed the following:

The CCP has kept pursuing happiness for the Chinese people, rejuvenation for the Chinese nation, and the common good for the world. China will continue to play its part in building world peace, promoting global development, and defending international order. China will stay committed to peace, development, cooperation and mutual benefit, and promote a new type of international relations. However strong it may grow, ***China will never seek hegemony, expansion, or a sphere of influence. Nor will China ever engage in an arms race. China will take an active part in multilateral cooperation on trade and investment, continue to develop the Hainan Free Trade Port, and develop new systems for a higher-standard open economy.*** All are welcome to share in the vast opportunities of the Chinese market (emphasis added).⁷¹

His actions since 2013 to seek hegemony in the world are totally different from what Xi portrayed

in his statement in the Boao forum. However, so-called mainstream media has not reported the above paragraph.⁷²

On June 11-13, 2021, the leaders of the Group of Seven (G7) met in the U.K., which was a host country in 2021 since the G7 summit was cancelled in the U.S. in last year.⁷³ For the first time ever, the communiqué of G7 mentioned Taiwan.⁷⁴ According to the communiqué of G7 “We underscore the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and encourage the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues.”⁷⁵ During the 2021 G7 summit, four countries comprised of South Korea, India, South Africa, and Australia, were invited into the summit. A day after the G7 summit, the summit of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was held on June 14, 2021 in Brussels, Belgium. NATO also considered China’s threat to be “systemic challenges” to international order. Its statement emphasized to develop “closer relations with its four Asia-Pacific partners, namely Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea and New Zealand.”⁷⁶ In the communiqué of NATO,

China’s stated ambitions and assertive behaviour present **systemic challenges to the rules-based international order and to areas relevant to Alliance security**. We are concerned by those coercive policies which stand **in contrast to the fundamental values enshrined in the Washington Treaty**. China is rapidly expanding **its nuclear arsenal with more warheads and a larger number of sophisticated delivery systems to establish a nuclear triad**. It is opaque in implementing its military modernisation and its publicly declared military-civil fusion strategy. It is also cooperating militarily with Russia, including through participation in Russian exercises in the Euro-Atlantic area. We remain concerned with **China’s frequent lack of transparency and use of disinformation**. We call on China to uphold its international commitments and to act responsibly in the international system, including in the space, cyber, and maritime domains, in keeping with its role as a major power (emphasis added).⁷⁷

During both the G7 and NATO closed-door meetings to discuss the China issue, the internet was totally cut off from outside because they were afraid of spies from the CCP.⁷⁸ Even an anti-Trump and left media *New York Times* reporter stated that the declaration of a “democracy versus autocracy” age is coming.⁷⁹

Somehow, in the nuclear section of *The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces*, Beijing left out China’s “no-first-use pledge,”⁸⁰ which has been a major Chinese nuclear policy since 1964 when China developed nuclear weapons. The “no-first-use pledge” was explicitly and unconditionally included in all national defense white papers most recently, in 2011.⁸¹ Some Western presses, especially the Japanese media,⁸² have been perplexed, wondering if China has changed its position on nuclear weapons. However, Pang Sen, Director-general of the Department of Arms Control in Geneva, stated, “China will never use a nuclear weapon on Japan,”⁸³ on April 19, 2013.

Xi Jinping's ambition to overtake the world has apparently been a topic of public discussions since the 2020 U.S. presidential election. Some scholars, including Japanese researchers, have exposed that Xi has worked with the deep state⁸⁴ to remove President Donald Trump from office.⁸⁵ By using the Covid-19 pandemic as an excuse, Xi has "helped" the deep state and American Leftists to get into the White House, taking away the presidency from Donald Trump on November 3, 2020. Whether one agrees or disagrees, the 2020 U.S. presidential election has been called "Coup d'état in American history."⁸⁶

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End Notes

- 1 Note: Chinese and Japanese personal names are given in the text in the customary order of family name first, such as Chiang Kai-shek or Tanaka Kakuei. Works published in English by Chinese and Japanese authors, however, are given in the Western order of putting the surname last, such as Ying-jeou Ma.
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