Introduction

Henry Kissinger is one of the extraordinary diplomats in the world; he is the ONLY person in the world who has met all generations of leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Mao Zedong (毛泽东), Deng Xiaoping (邓小平), Jiang Zemin (江泽民), Hu Jintao (胡锦涛), and Xi Jinping (习近平). Because Kissinger made a secret mission to China in 1971, achieving Sino-U.S. rapprochement, he was the person to “open” the Chinese “heavy” door to the world during the Nixon administration. Due to his efforts to dialogue with Communist China, American geopolitical strategy toward the Asian region has completely been changed.

After Washington made many errors in the 1950s, specifically the San Francisco Peace Treaty (SFPT), Kissinger, as a realistic diplomat who faced these mistakes and was instrumental in adjusting American foreign policy, played the crucial role in forming a well-known phrase — strategic ambiguity — of the Diaoyu (钓鱼) Islands, a “Band-Aid” solution. As the CIA’s memorandum indicated, “There is no chance that Peking (Beijing) will consider discussing boundaries or drilling rights with Taipei (台北).” In fact, visionary Zhou Enlai (周恩来) had a strong view regarding the “third-party” — the United States — intervening in the sovereignty of the Diaoyu Islands. In other words, the Diaoyu Islands had never been brought up during the Sino-U.S. Summit.

I. China: Playing the “American Card” against the Soviet Union

In December 2004, “History Declassified: Nixon in China,” the first TV documentary based on the fully declassified record of President Richard Nixon’s trip to China in 1972, was broadcast on the Discovery Times Channel. On top of the previously declassified secret U.S. documents, the newly available evidence from the China files revealed details of the dramatic Sino-U.S. diplomacy
Before 1972, Edgar Snow, a well-known Western journalist who met with Mao Zedong during the Cold War, had been the figure who provided "Chinese information" to the West before Nixon made his historical trip to China in 1972. A recent study by a Western scholar shows that China had also sent a "signal" to Washington through Edgar Snow, but the American journalist "had deliberately left out Mao’s invitation to Nixon, considering the message too sensitive to disclose at that point in time." According to the U.S. declassified archives, as early as 1969, a group of four Chinese Marshals recommended that Chairman Mao should play the American card against the Soviet threat and even undertake high-level talks with the United States. As the border fighting with the former Soviet Union intensified in August 1969, two Marshals, Chen Yi (陈毅) and Ye Jianying (叶剑英), proposed playing the American card against the Soviet Union to Chairman Mao. The first Chinese signal sent out from Beijing was January 28, 1969 when Renmin Ribao (人民日报) [People’s Daily] translated Richard Nixon’s inaugural address, but no one at the White House paid any attention. On December 18, 1970, Snow met with Mao for five hours of talks. Mao said:

[T]he foreign ministry was studying the matter of admitting Americans from the left, middle, and right to visit China. Should rightists like Nixon, who represented the monopoly capitalists, be permitted to come? He should be welcomed because, Mao explained, at present the problems between China and the US would have to be solved with Nixon. Mao would be happy to talk with him, rather as a tourist or a President (emphasis added).

The second signal delivered from Beijing was on December 25, 1970 when Renmin Ribao published a photo of Edgar Snow, Mao Zedong, and Lin Biao (林彪), another Chinese Marshal, reviewing a military parade at the Gate of Heavenly Peace. The second signal was picked up by the White House. Even though China expert Allen Whiting proposed going to Switzerland to debrief Snow about his trip to China and meeting with the leadership, John Holdridge, the soi-disant China expert on Kissinger’s staff, advised against the idea. His view was that Snow was a leftist and a spokesman of “Red” China. Had debriefing gone ahead, as suggested by Allen Whiting, Nixon could have learned of Mao’s invitation. By the end of April 1971 [after the critical meeting between Chou Shu-Kai (周书楷) from ROC (Republic of China) and Nixon on April 12], Snow finally published Mao’s invitation story in Life magazine. Kissinger admitted the error in Washington and wrote:

State (department) could not have had the full text of the interview, for it (a report of Edgar Snow’s impressions from his recent talks with Mao and
Zhou) ignored the important element of the invitation to Nixon.  

Ultimately, the Chinese message was delivered through today’s well-known Pakistan back channel, which eventually led to Henry Kissinger’s secret mission to Beijing through his Pakistan trip. Publicly, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) invited the U.S. World Team to China in April 1971, and what would be known as Ping-Pong diplomacy began. Secretly, the mission by Henry Kissinger was prepared in the White House. Kissinger’s first trip to Beijing was given the codename, “Polo,” after Marco Polo (1254-1324) who made history by traveling to the Middle Kingdom during the Mongolian dynasty. The secret mission by Kissinger eventually led to a historical event — Richard Nixon’s visit to China in February 1972, which shocked the world.

In the Cold War era, the Middle Kingdom basically was isolated from the world. In addition to being unwilling to mention the Diaoyu Islands — due to the interference of the third-party policy — in the Kissinger-Zhou meeting, from the Chinese side, the Diaoyu Islands had become “peanut” size in the whole Sino-U.S. relations because many other complicated issues, including Taiwan, the military threat from the Soviet Union, Japanese militarism, and the PRC joining the United Nations, were dominant problems or at the top of the agenda between Washington and Beijing. The Diaoyu Islands has never been at the top of the agenda between Beijing and Washington.

II. On a “Leash” Japan’s Militarism: Overhead Diplomacy

Meanwhile, the White House also tried to reach out to the Chinese; some signals were sent out already. On September 9, 1970, President Nixon asked Henry Kissinger to try again to reach the Chinese official. Finally, the American table tennis team paved the road to Beijing, opening the road map of normalization between Washington and Beijing. As Lee Kuan Yew stated,

President Nixon was a pragmatic strategist. He would engage, not contain, China, but he would also quietly set pieces into place for a fallback position should China not play according to the rules as a good global citizen.

Thus, the hawkish and right-wing conservative Nixon took a gamble by opening China to the world, changing geopolitics in the Asian region.

Just as the Chinese Marshals tried to use the American card against the Soviet Union, the United States also began to approach China by using the China card against the Soviet Union. Henry A. Kissinger’s secret mission to Beijing in July 1971 to meet with the Chinese senior leaders, including Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong, is a well-known story in the history of Sino-U.S. relations; his trip took place before President Nixon arrived in China in February 1972, shocking the
world.

1. Kissinger-Zhou meeting (a secret mission to Beijing) in 1971

In this secret mission to China, the Diaoyu Islands was not brought up in conversation. On July 9, 1971, when Zhou Enlai worried about Japan’s militarism, Kissinger summarized his conversation with Premier Zhou:

I declared flatly that we were not encouraging, and indeed opposed, any revival of Japanese expansionism. I agreed on the military implications of Japan’s economic growth and said that the U.S. and PRC interests coincided in trying to keep this growth under control. All the U.S. supported was Japan’s ability to defend itself. Paradoxically, the presence of U.S. troops on Japan helped to restrain the Japanese rather than the reverse. We would never collude with other countries in carving China up.  

Zhou Enlai “was one of the two or three most impressive men I have ever met,” wrote Kissinger; Zhou was a trusted leader in China for Kissinger. Kissinger’s message to China is noticeable — to expand Japanese militarism is not of interest in American policy. This policy was reconfirmed again when Kissinger visited China on November 11 of the same year, and even in the Nixon-Zhou conversations in 1972. When Prime Minister Edward Heath from the United Kingdom visited the White House on December 20, 1971, both Heath and Nixon mentioned China policy and Kissinger’s secret mission to the PRC (i.e., Overhead Diplomacy). Nixon discussed why the White House had to keep the bureaucracy in the dark when setting up the first Kissinger trip. Kissinger explained why it was not possible to inform allied governments any sooner than the July 15 (when White House made official announcement). According to Kissinger the ROC would leak his secret mission to China, and Washington could not afford to let Japan, “the leakiest government in the world,” know in advance.

Nixon: The Japanese are all over Asia like a bunch of lice. Let’s look at Japan and Germany: Both have a sense of frustration and a memory of defeat. What must be done is to make sure we have a home for them… Japan is today denied a nuclear capability; in terms of security, if our nuclear umbrella should become less credible, the effect on Japan would be a catastrophe.…

Heath: They are very thick-skinned. We ought to tie them in.

Nixon: We mustn’t leave Japan completely isolated. We give aid stupidly; the Japanese give aid too selfishly. We shouldn’t resent that if the Japanese play a constructive role ultimately; it won’t necessarily be the same kind of role as ours (emphasis added).

The image of Japan was not good in the eyes of either President Nixon or Prime Minister
Heath because of the Japanese way of playing foreign policy. The terms “lice” and “thick-skinned” to describe the Japanese elites demonstrate the world leaders’ feelings toward Japan. Even ODA (official Development Assistant), which the Tokyo regime gave to developing countries, has not impressed the world leaders. That is, the Japanese “stingy” image has not been removed, even today.

2. Nixon-Zhou Summit Meeting I

The U.S. troops stationed in Japan once again became the topic between Zhou Enlai and Richard Nixon. On February 22, 1972 (2:10 p.m.-6:00 p.m.), along with Henry Kissinger, Nixon and Enlai held a conversation in the Great Hall of the People, and the issue of the American troops in Japan was raised. The Japan issue was discussed as follows:

Nixon: As I said, more people than at any time in the history of the world heard our two speeches live.

Zhou: Yes, indeed, and since Dr. Kissinger made his first visit to Peking, we have abided by the principle of strict confidence. So we understand that is really quite difficult for you to do that.

Nixon: Now, if could turn and, as we have discussed, begin with the subject of Taiwan briefly at this point on things regarding which there is no disagreement....

Principle one. There is one China, and Taiwan is a part of China.... Second, we have not and will not support any Taiwan independence movement. Third, we will, to the extent we are able, use our influence to discourage Japan from moving into Taiwan as our presence becomes less, and also discourage Japan from supporting a Taiwan independence movement. I will only say here I cannot say what Japan will do, but so long as to the U.S. has influence with Japan — we have in this respect the same interests as the Prime Minister’s government — we do not want Japan moving in on Taiwan and will discourage Japan from doing so....

Let me in complete candor tell the Prime Minister what my problem is, from a political standpoint. The left wants this trip to fail, not because of Taiwan but because of the Soviet Union. And the right, for deeply principled ideological reasons, believes that no concessions at all should be made regarding Taiwan....

Kissinger: You forgot the pro-Japanese, like our friend, Professor Reischauer.

Nixon: I could add there is another strong group, those who are pro-Japan, like Reischauer; not because of Taiwan but because of Japan. He, too, was Dr. Kissinger’s student (Zhou laughs). They hope our movement toward relations with the People’s Republic of China will fail.... I apologize for talking so long.
Zhou: No.

Nixon: Then, as I look at the situation with respect to China, as we mentioned yesterday, the Soviet Union has more forces on the Sino-Soviet borders than it has arrayed against the Western Alliance. *Now, I think that, as the Prime Minister knows, I have asked Dr. Kissinger to provide a briefing to whomever the Prime Minister designates on very sensitive material, what we know to be totally reliable on both the position of the Soviet forces versus China and also the general nuclear balance.* I suggest that if the Prime Minister could designate, in addition to people on the civilian side, someone such as the Vice Chairman for Military Affairs... The meeting place should be highly secret, however, if this could be arranged.

Kissinger: We have.

Nixon: O.K....

Let me use one other example to bear out my argument that a U.S. presence in Asia is in the interest of not just the U.S. but in the interest of China. I think that the Prime Minister in terms of his philosophy has taken exactly the correct position with respect to Japan, for example the U.S. should withdraw its troops, the Treaty between Japan and the U.S. should be abrogated, and Japan should be left to become a neutral country that is unarmed... The U.S. can get out of Japanese waters, but others will fish there. *And both China and the U.S. have had difficult experiences with Japanese militarism.* We hope that the situation is changed permanently away from the militarism that has characterized Japanese government in the past. On the other hand, we cannot guarantee it and consequently we feel that if the U.S. were to leave Japan naked, one or two things would happen, both of them bad for China. The Japanese, with their enormously productive economy, their great natural drive and their memories of the war they lost, could well turn toward building their own defenses in the event that the U.S. guarantee were removed. *That’s why I say that where Taiwan is concerned, and I would add where Korea is concerned, the U.S. policy is opposed to Japan moving in as the U.S. moves out, but we cannot guarantee that. And if we had no defense arrangement with Japan, we would have no influence where that is concerned.*

On the other hand, Japan has the option of moving toward China and it also has the option of moving toward the Soviet Union. So the point I would summarize on is this. I can say, and I think the Prime Minister will believe me, that the U.S. has no designs on China, that the *U.S. will use its influence with Japan and those other countries...* But if the U.S. is gone from Asia, gone from Japan, our protests, no matter how loud, would be like — to use the Prime Minister’s phrase — *firing an empty cannon; we would have no rallying effect because fifteen thousand miles away is just too far to be heard....*

Zhou: Thank you (emphasis added).[^20]

---

[^20]: At least two important items need to be emphasized. (1) Before even the normalization with
China, Washington had already provided some “top secret intelligence” information to China against the Soviet Union, signifying that Nixon was playing the China card. This is an extremely unusual case because the United States had not normalized diplomatic ties with the PRC in 1972.

(2) The U.S. troops that stayed in Japan were not against China, but were present to prevent Japan’s remilitarization in the future. Washington did not want Japan to move into Taiwan whatsoever. The familiar sound of the 1972 Nixon doctrine may (or may not) be reflected in President Obama’s 2014 pivot-Asian-policy. Then, Zhou blamed Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石) for selling out Outer Mongolia, which Chiang Kai-shek consistently insisted was a Chinese territory in the following:

**Zhou:** For example, with respect to China after the Second World War; according to the Yalta Agreements, the U.S. was the principal country having a sphere of influence in China, whereas the Soviet Union only had a partial sphere of influence, in some parts of China....

What is more Chiang Kai-shek had a treaty with the Soviet Union at that time, which also was called the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance. It was to last for twenty years. In addition, according to the agreements reached at Yalta, Chiang Kai-shek recognized the independence of Outer Mongolia, which is now called as the People’s Republic of Outer Mongolia. Now, however Chiang Kai-shek says he regrets very much the establishment of diplomatic relations between Japan and the People’s Republic of Mongolia. I would like to write a letter to Chiang Kai-shek to ask him who signed the agreements providing independence for Outer Mongolia.... We didn’t even know about the Yalta Agreement. We learned of the terms of the Yalta Agreement quite late. In fact, we learned them from the KMT (Kuomintang 国民党) side.....

But just as Dr. Kissinger and Mr. President have said, there is no conflict between our two countries; there is no necessity for our interests to conflict or for the U.S. to occupy Chinese territory, even though on philosophy our two sides differ and we have the slogan, “Down with U.S. Imperialism.” Chairman Mao mentioned this yesterday that it is just “empty cannon.” Dr. Kissinger knows the phrase.

**Kissinger:** The Vice Minister knows it now too.

...  

**Nixon:** Yes (emphasis added)

The PRC seems to accept the explanation by President Nixon in terms of the U.S. bases in Japan. But Zhou blamed Chiang Kai-shek for the concurrence by the ROC with the Soviet Union under the Yalta Agreement, ceding Outer Mongolia to be independent as the People’s Republic of Mongolia. At the time of the Yalta Agreement, the Chiang regime as legitimate government certainly represented the Chinese people at the conference; Chiang’s regime should shoulder any responsibility for demarcation of the Chinese territories. Sadly, the Chinese internal fights between
Chiang and Mao never served the Chinese people, but only hurt the Chinese policy in the world community. Instead, the “fighting” among the Chinese only benefited the Japanese to claim sovereignty of the Diaoyu Islands.

3. Nixon-Zhou Summit Meeting II

The following day (February 23, 1972), both Chinese and American leaders discussed the Japan issue again:

**Nixon:** With regard to Japan, I must emphasize what I said yesterday. It is our policy to discourage Japan from any military intervention in Korea, but the extent to which we are able to implement that policy will depend on the extent to which we maintain close relations with Japan. I cannot guarantee it, but we believe we can very strongly influence Japan and our purpose will be to discourage any Japanese adventure against Korea and Taiwan.

**Zhou:** I always try to cite the 1969 Joint Communique (between prime minister Sato and President Nixon), but now the situation has changed. The situation on Okinawa has begun to change. And the question they face now is not Taiwan or South Korea, but the question of the four islands in the north.

**Nixon:** I hope our Soviet friends will be as generous with Japan as we were on Okinawa. (Chinese laughter) I told Sato that when I saw him in San Clemente. The Okinawa decision was the right thing to do, after a period of time, for it belonged to Japan.

**Zhou:** What caused the dissatisfaction of the Japanese people was that you still maintain nuclear bases. That still causes a problem.

...  

**Kissinger:** We have moved all nuclear weapons off Okinawa....  

**Nixon:** There are none there.  

**Zhou:** Japan is now at the crossroads, as I had discussed with Dr. Kissinger.... We hope that a new, independent, peaceful and democratic Japan will appear which will express a friendly attitude toward China and the United States.

**Nixon:** I want the Prime Minister to know that we do have an alliance with Japan despite the Great War we fought with Japan.... Our policy is, to the extent possible to restrain the Japanese from going from economic expansion to military expansion. But we can only do that if we have a close relationship with them. If we don’t have that close relationship, they aren’t going to pay any attention to us (emphasis added).

Nixon reiterated the U.S. policy to station the American bases in Japan — to restrain the Japanese to expand its “military power” behind economic power. Regarding the Reversion Treaty, Nixon stated that it “was the right thing to do.” Zhou did not claim sovereignty over Okinawa in this conversation, but worried about nuclear weapons in Okinawa, which were already moved out by the United States. Furthermore, Nixon wished the Soviet leader would return the northern terri-
tory to Japan, just as the United States returned Okinawa to Japan. Fascinatingly, the conversation between Nixon and Zhou over the Reversion Treaty did not include a single word about sovereignty of the Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea; both the Chinese and Americans cared less about the Diaoyu Islands issue between Beijing and Tokyo in the 1970s.

4. Nixon-Zhou Summit Meeting III

On February 24, 1972, Nixon once again persuaded Zhou Enlai to accept the American troops stationed in Japan:

Nixon: Let me use a comparison with Japan. For example, I know the Prime Minister’s position is that we should withdraw our forces from Japan. I do not agree with that position, as shown in the communique, and I will not withdraw our forces from Japan, because I believe that our interest in peace in the Pacific is to restrain Japan. All the things that we have talked about require our forces staying... 

Zhou: Firstly, you hope for and will not hinder a peaceful liberation. Secondly, it was that you would discourage and not allow Japanese armed forces to come to Taiwan while your forces are still there. You will try to avoid in any event but need forces in Japan to do that.

Nixon: That’s right, while we still have forces in Japan. But you meant while our forces are still on Taiwan?

... 

Zhou: That is to say, while you still have forces in Japan?

Nixon: Precisely that. Unless we have forces in Japan, they won’t pay any attention to us.

... 

Zhou: But if Japanese armed forces are allowed to invade South Korea that would create tension. Dr. Kissinger admitted that Japan had made some attempts, and they had already sent personnel. Of course, these are not in the form of troops, but some military men. We are watching closely such activity of theirs, and we believe you are, too.

Nixon: That is one place where neither the interest of the People’s Republic or the United States would be served by the Japanese intervention in Korea. We cannot guarantee we can keep out Japanese intervention, but to the extent we can do so, we will use our influence to discourage it.

Zhou: As for the question of Japan... if China and Japan are able to restore diplomatic relations, Chinese-Japanese friendship should not hurt the relations between Japan and the United States. We even said that if we are able to establish diplomatic relations with Japan and conclude a peace treaty with Japan, then we will even consider a mutual non-aggression pact with Japan. They are worried about our nuclear armament, but we can guarantee that we will not be the first to use them. We don’t pose any threat to them. But such a treaty would not exclude Japan from having relations with other countries (emphasis added).21

Nixon repeated that the necessity to restrain the Japanese from expanding their military power was
part of the American policy regarding stationing U.S. forces in Japan. Looking back on the Nixon-Zhou 1972 conversation in 2014, Prime Minister Zhou Enlai might have been “shortsighted” in his “understanding” of the Japanese. To sign a peace treaty including a mutual nonaggression pact with Japan that could retain the Japanese behavior is simply wrong. History tells otherwise. Even though the Chinese signed such a peace treaty with Japan in 1871, the treaty did not stop Japan’s “lightning” attack on China in 1894, 23 years later. The Japanese lightning attack on the Chinese army occurred again in the 1930s; the “non-aggression pact” with Japan might not be the best solution given the current geopolitics in the Asian region, especially in Japan.

5. Kissinger-Zhou Meeting in June 1972

In September 2006, some essential conversations between Kissinger and Zhou Enlai found in the U.S. archives were declassified. The length of the documented Kissinger-Zhou conversations was thousands of pages. The topic of Sino-Japanese relations often factored into their conversations, and Japan was one of the major issues in their meeting. The subject of Japan was brought up on June 19, 1972, as follows:

Kissinger: This was where it all began.
Zhou: With the same participants (Lord and Pineau, the stenographer).
...
Kissinger: I was accused in a New York Times article of conducting a China-first policy two days ago
Zhou: Oh, is that true? We haven’t seen that editorial.
Kissinger: I will give it to you. I have a copy.
Zhou: They say you practice China first?
Kissinger: China first, at the expense of Japan.
Zhou: That might not be so because you also said some very nice things in Japan....
Kissinger: There was no way I could avoid telling them, being in Japan 48 hours before the announcement was made. But we told all three — we told both Fukuda and Tanaka, so nobody could claim any preference.
...
Zhou: I would only like to ask you one thing. Do you not oppose China discussing with Japan the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations?
Kissinger: I favor it.
...
Zhou: What was the main theme?
...
Kissinger: Four, that the Japanese military should confine themselves to the conventional defense of their home islands.
Zhou: I believe you first mentioned that the U.S.-Japan Treaty was necessary.
Kissinger: Yes, I said that, but we have always said this to you (emphasis added).^{24}

The requirement that the Japanese military expansion be on a “leash” is the key point Washington must sell to the Chinese. Finally, the Chinese side seems to “acquiesce” regarding the Japanese-U.S. security pact and the U.S. bases in Japan.


The principle of the United States foreign policy toward Sino-Japanese relations was to favor an improved friendship between two countries. In 1973, Kissinger further indicated the Japanese military problem when he talked to the Chinese premier Zhou Enlai.

Zhou: So, should we go on to Japan?
Kissinger: With respect to Japan I am still advocating the negative aspects of its involvement in the world. We think that the normalization of relations between Japan and the PRC is a good thing. It is in our interests. And, as the Prime Minister knows, we not only did not place obstacles in the way, we encouraged it.

...  
Kissinger: That is a good stance to generalize.
Zhou: I think it was something about security interest on a reciprocal basis....
Kissinger: Yes. To go back to Japan, we value your relations positively because we think it is important that Japan be anchored with as many countries as possible that have peaceful intentions. The danger in Japan is what we already discussed, that the very aggressive economic nationalism which now exists could in time become political nationalism and perhaps even military nationalism.
Zhou: That is what we had previously discussed — that economic expansion would lead into military expansion.
Kissinger: And certain tendencies indicate at least — our experience is (I don’t know what yours has been) that the individual Japanese leaders are not particularly impressive but the over-all Japanese performance is extremely impressive. And there is also a danger that if the Japanese pursue this economic policy so aggressively they could get sucked into arrangements with other people with less peaceful intentions in Siberia, the Middle East and Southeast Asia, which could affect their interests....^{25}

To be sure, harnessing Japanese military expansion remained a continuing concern in Kissinger’s mind. Unfortunately, Japanese political elite began a move towards military growth without notice by the world in the 2010s.
Conclusion

Kissinger’s concerns were well-founded as evidenced by Abe’s regime since December 2012. Abe changed the total landscape of Japanese politics by allowing Japanese Self-Defense to join collective defense overseas. Currently, with a majority of coalition members in the both houses, he is ready to change Article 9 of the Japanese constitution, allowing the Japanese military to dispatch forces overseas again. Just as in 1930s-1940s, will the Japanese militarism appear in historical textbooks again? Time will only tell.

Unlike the Nixon-Kissinger era in the 1970s, today’s White House has permitted overarching change in the Japanese political landscape. Ironically, President Barack Obama’s launch of the U.S. pivot-Asian-policy in 2010 against China has provided another chance for Japan to confront the Chinese over sovereignty of the Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea. Fundamentally, as Zhou Enlai had warned in 1972, the United States is playing the Diaoyu Islands “card” to balance Tokyo and Beijing. Both China and Japan should negotiate the issue honestly.

Bibliography


Works Cited

Note: This article, which is excluded from the author’s forthcoming book, is a part of the research during the 2013 sabbatical year.

1 The “Diaoyu” will be used in this research because the letter “D” (i.e., Diaoyu) comes before “S” (i.e., Senkaku). However, this use does not imply that the author takes a position over the Sino-Japanese territorial disputes.

2 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Intelligence Report: The Senkaku Islands Dispute: Oil under Troubled Waters? (May 1971): p. 6. This report was released from the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica in Taiwan. p. 7.

3 “New Documentary Reveals Secret U.S., Chinese Diplomacy behind Nixon’s Trip,” The National Secu-


Ibid.


President Nixon met Pakistani President Yahya Khan at the White House in October 1970, and President Khan delivered President Nixon’s message to China in November 1970. By December 1970, President Nixon received Premier Zhou’s personal message, indicating his willingness to invite a U.S. special envoy to China. The story was that when Henry Kissinger visited Pakistan and met with Pakistani President Yahya Khan in July 1971, in order to camouflage Kissinger’s visit to Beijing, the announcement publicly was that Kissinger got the “flu” and a “stomachache” in Pakistan. Meanwhile, Kissinger was on his way to China on a Chinese plane that Beijing had prepared for him. It has been called a secret visit to China. For details, see Ibid., pp. 793-842.


The Overhead Diplomacy means that the US made a secret deal with the PRC without noticing its allies, in particular Japan.


“Memorandum for the President’s File,” December 20, 1971, box 87, Nixon Presidential Library.

Ibid.


Ibid., pp. 15-31.

